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The paper develops an evolutionary selection model of the cultural transmission of prefer-
ences, focusing on the survival probability of certain preference types. The ﬁtness of a preference
is deﬁned in terms of the ease with which its carrier can transmit the preference to the young. For
example, a taste for work gives its carriers more income than is obtained by those who carry a
taste for leisure. If higher income allows a given carrier to transmit her preferences more easily,
then those with a taste for work will be more likely to transmit their preferences to the young;
hence a taste for work will be more evolutionarily ﬁt than a taste for leisure. In general, cultural
transmission of preferences will favor any tastes that facilitate their own transmission, especially
tastes for social achievements such as income, power, mass communication, and knowledge. The
resulting pattern of tastes can be biased in the following sense: if the young generation were not
inﬂuenced by achievement effects, they would choose preferences that would make them happier.
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ABSTRACT:
The paper develops an evolutionary selection model of the cultural transmission of 
preferences, focu sing on the survival probability of certain preference types. The fitness 
of a preference is defined in terms of the ease with which its carrier can transmit the 
preference to the young. For example, a taste for work gives its carriers more income 
than is  obtained by those who carry a taste for leisure. If higher income allows a given 
carrier to transmit her preferences more easily, then those with a taste for work will be 
more likely to transmit their preferences to the young; hence a taste for work will b e more 
evolutionarily fit than a taste for leisure. In general, cultural transmission of preferences 
will favor any tastes that facilitate their own transmission, especially tastes for social 
achievements such as income, power, mass communication, and know ledge. The 
resulting pattern of tastes can be biased in the following sense: if the young generation 
were not influenced by achievement effects, they would choose preferences that would 
make them happier. 
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I. Introduction
This paper focuses on preferences as the object of evolutionary selection. It 
assumes that the fitness of a preference is determined by  its ability to be transmitted from 
the members of one generation (usually a parent) to the members of the following 
generation (usually that parent's child). A specific 'preference' is a member of a set of 
utility function parameters, and it is assumed th at young people obtain an initial 
parameter set, at the age of maturity, by a process that combines elements of biological 
hardwiring with elements of enculturation.
1 The focus here will be on the latter process, 
by which an individual’s cultural environme nt affects his or her tastes. Increasingly, 
social scientists are unwilling to take preferences as given, and new lines of research are 
beginning to explore the role of the social, economic, and institutional environment in 
shaping tastes (Frank, 1987; Kur an, 1991; Boyd and Richerson, 1994; Bowles, 1998; 
Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998; see also Becker, 1996; Gintis, 1972).
2 The endowment of 
preferences being, at least partly, a cultural process, it can be studied using theories of 
cultural evolution (Boyd and  Richerson, 1985). Recent papers in the economics literature 
that study preferences strictly from the standpoint of cultural evolution include Rogers' 
(1994) analysis of time preferences, Bisin and Verdier's (2000) analysis of ethnic and 
religious traits, a nd Bowles and Gintis' (1998) study of the evolution of pro -social norms, 
and Guth and Ockenfels' (2000) work on cooperation.
3
The contribution of this paper is to focus on the mechanisms by which 
preferences may be culturally transmitted, and how differen t kinds of preferences will 
endow their carriers (that is, the people who have these preferences) with different levels 
of resources that are effective in that mechanism. Preferences that are amplified by the 3
mechanism will be more fit and will flourish. T he patterns of preferences that result are 
not necessarily the ones that maximize biological fitness (a point that has been made 
before), nor are they ones that maximize human happiness or well -being (a point that has 
not been made before). They will, howe ver, share a general feature that I will call 
'achievement.' I will argue that tastes for certain social achievements (such as income or 
knowledge) are systematically favored by the preference transmission mechanisms of 
human societies in general. As a res ult, there is a general bias in human culture in favor 
of tastes for these achievements, regardless of whether these activities increase our 
biological fitness or improve our psychological sense of well -being.
For example, consider a small hunter -gatherer  village and imagine that all orphans 
are given to the leader to be raised. Suppose children start adult life with the preferences 
of the person who raised them. The transmission mechanism could be described as one in 
which children are usually endowed with  their parent's preferences, but sometimes they 
may receive the preferences of the leader. Given this mechanism, a preference for power 
has an evolutionary advantage over preferences for other activities. People who enjoy the 
pursuit of power are more like ly to become leaders; being leaders, they are able to pass 
their taste for power activities to the village orphans. If the leader represents x percent of 
the village population, we would expect at least x percent of the village's children to 
enjoy power -seeking activity simply because they are the leader's children (assuming 
leaders and others are equally fertile). However, if an additional y percent of the children 
are orphans who are raised by the leader, then the percentage of children who have a taste 
for power is x + y. Thus, since x + y is greater than x, the transmission mechanism favors 
power-seeking preferences. Moreover, in each generation, the fraction of children who 4
are power -seekers is higher than in the previous generation. Eventually, everyon e in the 
village will, at the age of maturity, have a taste for activities that lead to power; everyone 
will want to be the leader, at least when they emerge from childhood. 
Note that this example does not require that a taste for power should increase 
biological fitness (indeed, leaders and followers are assumed to have equal biological 
fitness). Nor is it necessary that the pursuit of power make people happy or satisfied.
4 If 
we assume that the pursuit of power in itself does not make people happy, then  it is 
probable that many or most young adults, as they mature, would eventually remove the 
desire to be leader from their brains; they would engage in the time -consuming process of 
altering their own preferences.
5 Nonetheless, it is still true that the per son who does 
become leader, happy or not, will generally have a stronger taste for power than anyone 
else, and will pass that taste on to the children she raises. In the steady state, this society 
would consist of repeated cohorts of universally avid power -seeking children, who then, 
as adults, become either successful but unhappy leaders, or unsuccessful but happy 
followers. 
Of course, forces well beyond those present in this simple example will have an 
affect on cultural transmission, so the main object ive of the paper is to show the existence 
of achievement bias in a more plausible general model of preference transmission. The 
model will take account of several realistic forces. First, it will account for the fact that 
culture is not everything, and tha t some element of human motivation is hard -wired in the 
brain. Second, it will allow people with the same tastes to group themselves, so that a 
child is less likely to be encultured by an adult from another group. Third, the model 
allows children some judg ment, in that they will be more likely to adopt the preferences 5
of adults who are happier. Fourth, it will account for natural selection (the differential 
mortality rates of people with different characteristics) as well as endogenous preference 
changes du ring adult life. Fifth, it will allow group selection, as when groups with low 
resources are more likely to die out. The model does not explicitly account for assortive 
mating, since its force is already captured in the assumption that people with similar 
tastes tend to stay in separate groups.
As for methods, the paper adopts the position from the start that utility and well -
being are not the same. Utility is a numerical ranking of desired states that serves as a 
guide to the rational choice of actions, w hile well -being is a substantive assessment of the 
goodness of a person's life. In one way of thinking about it, well -being is synonymous 
with happiness, and throughout the paper the two terms will be interchanged freely.
6
Clearly, happiness and utility ar e not always the same, since it is possible that rational 
actions that achieve higher -ranked and hence more desired outcomes may still leave the 
agent less happy. To view happiness and utility as distinct is not uncommon (and will be 
defended below), but i t does introduce some methodological wrinkles that should be kept 
in mind. First, an individual who maximizes utility over choice of some good x will have 
a value x
* that represents the utility -maximizing choice, but also a different value x 0 that 
represents the choice of highest happiness. In a typical economics paper, one would 
discuss x
* as the value that is "best" in some sense. Here, however, it may or may not be 
best; x 0 is best, always. Second, most papers on the cultural evolution of preferences 
assume that agents will switch their type if they encounter other agents with higher 
payoffs, i.e. higher utility. Here, however, payoffs and happiness are not the same, and it 
will be argued that the preference changes should be based not on the comparison o f 6
payoffs, but on the comparison of happiness levels. The reason is that happiness can be 
compared across people (with error of course), but utility cannot be.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III make an argument for 
approaching cultura l transmission as a matter of well -being, not utility. This is done in 
two parts, responding to two separate arguments in favor of deriving all cultural 
dynamics from utility. The first argument is that utility, as economists understand it, is 
essentially  the same thing as biological or 'Darwinian' fitness.
7 Section II makes a case 
against that view. The second argument is that utility is essentially the same thing as 
happiness; Section III makes a case against that view and derives some implications for 
the way that one should model preference evolution. Section IV then identifies several 
achievement mechanisms and describes how they affect preference evolution. Section V 
illustrates how these mechanisms may function in a formal model of preference 
evolution, using tastes for work and leisure as an example. Section VI concludes. 
II. Cultural Transmission: Utility and Fitness
The idea that culture can be understood through the lens of evolutionary selection 
was introduced in several seminal works (Ruyle, 1 973; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldmann, 1981; Lumsden and Williamson, 1981). The basic insight 
is to treat a cultural characteristic (for example, that red octogonal signs mean 'stop') as a 
gene-like entity, variously called "meme" (Daw kins, 1976) or "culturgen" (Lumsden and 
Williamson) or simply "trait." The trait lives in an environment that consists of the brains 
of humans and the modes of interaction between them, and it may thrive or die there. A 
trait thrives if humans successfully  teach it to other humans, especially children. 7
A core issue in the literature has been the question of whether cultural evolution 
must be consistent with biological evolution. Culture itself must be the product of natural 
selection, it is argued, and the refore culture must serve the biological fitness of human 
beings. If so, then culture is merely an intermediate object, a medium by which the forces 
of natural selection shape human society to serve the goals of biological fitness. Rogers 
(1994), for examp le, assumes that time preferences must be in an evolutionary 
equilibrium, in the sense that no change would improve Darwinian fitness. This then 
implies that the MRS in utility must be equal to the MRS in Darwinian fitness; in effect, 
if culture exists at  all, it exists only to give people the time preferences that maximize 
their Darwinian fitness. 
Boyd and Richerson (1985), however, show that while culture itself may be 
adaptive (i.e. may enhance Darwinian fitness), not all of the behavior it produces nee d do 
so. In general, a child will have a better chance of surviving to child -bearing age if it is 
capable of culture, but that capability, in certain environments, may generate cultures that 
encourage behaviors that lower Darwinian fitness. 
There are two  specific cases, however, in which cultural transmission perfectly 
preserves traits that serve Darwinian fitness. The first is  guided variation with unbiased 
transmission: people learn various traits as they go along, and then transmit them to their 
children. I will refer to this as the 'learning' mechanism. The second is  transmission with 
direct bias: people choose which traits to adopt according to some criterion, such as 
happiness. I will refer to this as the 'direct' mechanism. 
If these are the only cul tural transmission mechanisms, then cultural transmission 
perfectly preserves the pattern of traits that best serves Darwinian fitness. Take the direct 8
mechanism as an example. Suppose people choose traits using some criterion ('I choose 
to adopt my teache r's traits because she seems to be successful'). One may ask where the 
criterion (success is good) come from? Under natural selection, people would be more 
likely to survive to parenthood if they use choice criteria that serve fitness. Thus, 
evolutionary p ressure molds our brains so that our notion of success is consistent with 
fitness, and we therefore, in choosing traits that make us successful, only choose traits 
that serve fitness. Hence, the direct mechanism is molded by natural selection. If natural 
selection would have dictated a distribution F(x) of some trait x in a population, then the 
distribution under cultural transmission with the direct mechanism will also be F(x). 
However, other mechanisms of cultural transmission may encourage traits that d o 
not enhance fitness, and indeed such maladaptive traits may survive. That this can happen 
is the result of identifiable biases in the way that culture transmits traits. Boyd and 
Richerson describe two such biased mechanisms: frequency dependent bias and indirect 
bias. Frequency dependent bias occurs because humans may be more inclined to adopt a 
trait that is shared by many other humans in their environment. Indirect bias stems from a 
tendency to imitate unimportant traits we can observe (such as a certai n language dialect), 
on the assumption that they are correlated with important traits we cannot observe (such 
as business acumen). 
That such cultural biases can move society well away from patterns of maximal 
biological fitness is illustrated by the demog raphic transition that accompanies 
industrialization (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, p. 200). In developed economies, people 
have fewer children, and that seems to be a biologically maladaptive behavior. However, 
it can be explained as the result of the indirec t bias mechanism, combined with natural 9
selection. Small families are wealthier families, and members of wealthier families are a) 
more likely to be imitated by others, under the indirect bias mechanism, and b) more 
likely to survive to an age at which the y can transmit culture.
For economists, this anthropological discussion brings up an important question: 
are preferences transmitted by fitness -preserving mechanisms? It certainly is possible; 
indeed Rogers (1994) explicitly assumes so. Suppose, for exampl e, that people choose 
their preferences solely according to their payoffs in the environment, and then transmit 
them in a largely unconscious process to their children. That would be an example of the 
learning mechanism. Moreover, suppose that people tend  to adopt the preferences of 
other people who seem to have higher payoffs (producing what is known as a 'replicator 
dynamic'). That would be an example of the direct mechanism.
8 From the discussion 
above, we know that these mechanisms would ensure that the  preferences of agents 
would exactly reflect Darwinian fitness; utility maximization would be the same thing as 
fitness maximization. Gintis (2000) reviews a very large literature (mostly in economics) 
in which preferences evolve in this way, typically thro ugh the replicator dynamic. Thus, 
in this literature, the implicit assumption is that utility and fitness are equivalent. 
The broader implications of the anthropological literature, however, are that this 
assumed equivalency between utility and fitness is  not always warranted. Suppose that in 
some situation the dominant form of cultural transmission of preferences involves 
frequency dependent bias (e.g. herd -like behavior, informational cascades, or reputational 
cascades) instead of direct bias (e.g. the d irect mechanism and the replicator dynamics). 
Then we know from the anthropological literature that the resulting pattern of preferences 
need not give the population the highest level of Darwinian fitness (Gintis 2000, pp. 217 -10
219).
9 Moreover, in models w ith these herd -like evolutionary mechanisms, it can be the 
case that types with low payoffs can survive (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welsh, 
1992; Harrington, 1999; Banerjee 1992). Furthermore, since now the survival of 
preferences is not dictated entire ly by natural selection, it is no longer necessarily true 
that each action that raises utility also raises fitness. The two objectives, fitness and 
utility, are no longer equivalent. 
This does not mean, of course, that biological fitness has nothing to do  with 
preferences at all. There is considerable evidence that emotional states are to some extent 
hard-wired into the brain (Miller, 2000; Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992; Ledoux, 
1996). At the same time, it is a core assumption of economics that individ uals pursue 
happy states and avoid unhappy ones. Taken together, these two ideas suggest that tastes 
are partly determined by our desire for happiness, and that the states we consider ‘happy’ 
are those selected by millennia of biological evolution. Thus, b iology has some influence 
on our preferences. That influence may not be all that there is however, if we believe the 
cultural anthropology literature. There may be cultural forces that influence tastes, in a 
way that has nothing to do with the pursuit of h appiness.
The case that all our cultural traits must be consistent with biological fitness 
seems unpersuasive on a deeper level as well. Four million years have elapsed since the 
appearance of the first hominids, and the amount of time in which these organ isms have 
been capable of culture (dating from the first stone figurines) is only about 32,000 years. 
In other words, we have been watching an opera for two hours, and cultural humanity has 
just come on stage and sung for about one minute. We cannot tell f rom her performance 
in that brief time whether she will still be alive when the curtain falls. True, cultural 11
humanity seems to play a dominant role at the moment. But given the short amount of 
time in which we have been capable of culture, it seems specio us (to me at least) to argue 
that this or that cultural practice must be or must not be adaptive in the biological long 
run for the current version of hominids. 
Thus, for several reasons, the anthropological literature suggests that it is not 
appropriate  to assume that preferences in economic models must also serve Darwinian 
fitness. Instead one must begin by addressing the question of how well the preference can 
survive in its evolutionary environment, i.e., in the minds of the people who carry and 
transmit it. This requires an examination of the mechanism of transmission. If a 
preference is transmitted by things like the learning mechanism or the direct mechanism 
only (as with a replicator dynamic operating on payoffs), then the frequency of the 
preference in the population will be the same as if that frequency were instead dictated 
only by Darwinian fitness. If the preference is transmitted by some other mechanism, 
however, its frequency will be not be dictated by Darwinian fitness.
III. Cultural Transmi ssion: Utility and Well -Being
The preceding discussion opens the possibility that a force unrelated to Darwinian 
fitness, and unrelated to emotional states of happiness or well -being, may drive the 
evolution of preferences.
10 To pose this question is to pe rmit utility and well -being to be 
different, a distinction that is not common for economists to make. It is worth reflecting 
on the case for treating the two notions as less than completely equivalent, which is fairly 
well-developed in the philosophy of ec onomics. The distinction has important 
implications for the modeling of preference change.12
To begin with, utility is just an enumeration of the extent to which the agent has 
achieved his goals, while well -being is a substantive notion about a person's stat e of mind 
or existence (Hausman and McPherson, 1996, ch. 6). Specifically, there is nothing in the 
theory of utility requiring that preference satisfaction necessarily lead to emotional 
satisfaction. Some of the things you desire are not good for you; the  attainment of your 
goals will not always make you happy. Indeed, studies of subjective happiness (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2000; Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, 1999) suggest that a significant increase 
in income ceteris paribus, which will raise utility in almost  every reasonable economic 
model, is usually not matched by a significant increase in happiness.
11 Several studies 
have shown that long -run increases in per capita GDP do not significantly increase 
satisfaction (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswal d, 2000). 
The distinction between utility and happiness has fairly important implications for 
models of cultural transmission of preferences. In most of the endogenous preference 
literature (see Gintis, 2000), the transmission mechanism is of the direct  type, relying on 
comparisons of payoffs between agents. Agents of type A who perceive that agents of 
type B are 'doing well,' i.e. obtaining high payoffs, are likely to change their type from A 
to B. But why would an A type desire the payoffs of a B type?  Perhaps it is because the 
payoffs represent substantive well -being. In other words, suppose we assume that the A 
types believe the following: if they were to adopt the preferences of the B types, and then 
act as those preferences dictate, they would find t hemselves with higher payoffs and also 
higher well -being. 
Such an assumption may make sense in certain circumstances but is not tenable if 
utility and well -being are allowed to be different. Suppose the B types happen to care 13
little about their freedom wh ile the A types care quite a bit about it; otherwise they are 
the same. Suppose further that in this society, slaves make a great deal of money but free 
people make very little, so that the B's generally have higher utility  - they make a lot of 
money and d o not really care about being slaves. Suppose still further that an A type 
always has lower utility when a slave than when free. And finally, suppose that slaves 
always score lower than free people on psychological tests of subjective happiness. 
According  to the payoff - based cultural transmission mechanism, A types will say 'were I 
to adopt the B's apathy regarding freedom, I could let myself become a slave, make more 
money, and obtain the higher utilities of the B types.' If an A type did this, however, an d 
became a slave, in what sense is he better off? True, his utility, being now determined by 
the B preferences, is higher. However: a) his utility under the A preferences is now lower, 
and b) he is less happy, according to psychological tests of emotional  satisfaction. Thus, 
cultural transmission according to payoffs involves assuming that people would willingly 
choose to make a change that, according to their preferences at the time of the choice, 
would lower their utility. And of course it also assumes th at people would make a change 
that would lower their level of emotional satisfaction or happiness.
The example highlights two problems with the assumption that people will switch 
preferences according to the utilities that those preferences allow. The firs t problem 
derives simply from the fact that utility cannot be compared across people. Utility is just 
an index number, an ordering of states. To say that Bird has reached a state numbered 
107 for him while Castronova has reached a state numbered 2.38769384  for him is not to 
say that Bird is in a better situation. It certainly does not follow that Castronova would 
want to  be Bird, as payoff -based cultural transmission requires.14
The second problem derives from the fact that satisfying preferences does not 
guarantee higher levels of human well -being. People willingly do things that make them 
unhappy, or that are not good for them in some broad sense. Otherwise self -command 
would not be the important research topic that it is in many fields  -- including economic s 
to an increasing degree (Thaler and Sheffrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984; Becker and Murphy, 
1988; see the chapters in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, 1999, Part V).
12 The concept 
of utility is a proper guide to the analysis of actions, but it is no more than t hat; it is not a 
perfect guide to the substantive value of actions; it does not indicate how happy one will 
be from taking those actions; it does not measure how much a person's world is improved 
by those actions. Sen (1993 and elsewhere) and others (see H ausman and McPherson, 
1996) have persuasively argued for substantive concepts of well -being, ones that are not 
based on preference -satisfaction alone. Again, to say that Bird has higher utility than 
Castronova is not, in general, to say that Bird has a bet ter life than Castronova, or is 
happier. And again, it certainly does not follow that Castronova would want to  be Bird, as 
payoff-based cultural transmission requires.
The possibility that preferences may evolve according to something other than 
utility ha s been recognized in the literature, although the implications for the substantive 
theory of well -being have not been explored to any great degree. Guth and Yaari (1992), 
Guth and Ockenfels (2000) and others have developed models of indirect preference 
evolution, in which the fitness of a type is determined by a subset of total payoffs. Thus, 
if utility is given by u = x + y, fitness is given by f = x. Types replicate more rapidly if 
their actions, which are motivated by both x and y, happen to lead to high er values of x. 
Because x is an element of utility, however, such models are essentially utility - based, 15
payoff-based evolution models. Moreover, they make no distinction between utility and 
well-being. Indirect preference evolution models are therefore not  immune to the 
discussion above. 
One might respond by arguing that there may be some metric, such as money, that 
is comparable across people and is reasonably related to well -being. If payoffs are 
defined as money, however, a payoff -based mechanism of cu ltural transmission assumes 
that type A agents would switch to type B if and only if type B agents had more money. 
Thus it assumes that the types care only about money and nothing else. In other words, it 
assumes that money is not just a reasonable metric  of well -being: it is the only metric of 
well-being. In some circumstances such an assumption may be reasonable, but in general 
it is not. In fact, assuming that cash is equivalent to well -being is more restrictive and 
unreasonable than the prior assumption  that utility is equivalent to well -being. Denoting 
payoffs as cash may solve the comparability problem, but only by making more heroic 
assumptions about the nature of well -being.
Evidently, models of the cultural transmission of preferences can be based  on 
payoff comparisons only under certain circumstances. What are those circumstances? 
When is it plausible that a type A would  want to be a type B? The most immediate and 
intuitive answers generally involve well -being. That is, we would expect type A to de sire 
type B's situation if and only if A believes that B has higher well -being, in some 
substantive sense. Perhaps B appears to be happier, or B scores higher on psychological 
tests of emotional satisfaction. Perhaps the rate of suicide and depression is l ower among 
type Bs. Perhaps the Bs all live the Good Life according to some objectively substantive 
criterion (e.g. Sen's functionings): their health is better, their family relations are more 16
peaceful, they consume more art, etc. All of these circumstance s are probably hard -wired 
by our mental biology; they are comparable (albeit with error) across people; and it is 
more than plausible that people with low well -being (by these definitions) would want to 
be people with higher well -being. Intuition alone alm ost forces one to conclude that well -
being, and not utility, must be the fundamental criterion by which people choose their 
preferences.
If well -being is the fundamental criterion of preference evolution, then, when will 
it be justifiable to assume that  utility and well -being are equivalent, so that cultural 
transmission can be based on payoffs? Such an assumption is justified in certain 
circumstances if one now reconsiders the role of Darwinian fitness. Suppose first that 
well-being is essentially the me ntal state of happiness.
13 Suppose that biological 
evolution endowed the human mind with the emotions of happiness and sadness simply 
as a way to motivate survival.
14 That is, all situations produce good and bad emotions 
depending entirely on whether Darwini an fitness is rising or falling. Since people are 
driven to seek happiness and avoid sadness, they are driven by this psychological pattern 
to seek fitness and avoid extinction. In the course of their lives people will form certain 
preferences that effecti vely dictate their behavior; they learn to do this and not that 
because doing this makes them happy, or because someone else did this and became 
happy. In other words, they apply a criterion of substantive well -being, in order to learn 
which preferences ar e best (the learning mechanism), as well as to copy preferences from 
others (the direct mechanism). From the anthropology literature discussed in Section II, 
we know that these mechanisms will simply preserve the preferences that best serve the 
criterion b y which the preferences are chosen. That is, if people choose their preferences 17
according to criterion X, these mechanisms will ensure that the population will consist 
entirely of people whose utilities are maximized when X is maximized. Here the criterion
X is happiness. Hence, if learning and direct mechanisms are the sole source of cultural 
transmission, then utility will be the same thing as happiness. Moreover, biological 
evolution is assumed to have given people the criterion X so that it accords with
Darwinian fitness; natural selection has made happiness and fitness equivalent. Thus 
biology makes happiness and fitness equivalent, while culture makes happiness and 
utility equivalent; hence fitness, happiness, and utility are all the same. 
The genera l equivalence of these three depends entirely on the structure of 
cultural transmission, however. It holds only because natural selection translates fitness 
into happiness, and then culture translates happiness into utility. However, in Section II it 
was a rgued that cultural transmission does not always have this effect. That is, suppose 
that happiness is indeed the criterion by which people choose preferences under the 
learning and direct mechanisms. If these are the only operating mechanisms of cultural 
transmission, then preferences will be maximized when happiness is maximized. 
However, there may be other mechanisms at work, such as herd behavior and the like. 
These generate evolutionary forces that push preferences away from the criterion that is 
employed in the learning and direct mechanisms. Naïve agents who are searching about 
for a preference to adopt will be subject to conflicting forces: on the one hand, they are 
more likely to adopt (or be encultured into) the tastes of someone who seems happy; on
the other, they are more likely to adopt (or be encultured into) the tastes of people whom 
they see more often  – whether or not those people are happy. As a result, the preferences 
that are adopted may not maximize happiness. When the learning and direct  mechanisms 18
are in conflict with other mechanisms, the criteria they employ will not be the only 
determinant of preferences. Thus, utility and happiness will not be the same, and it 
follows that utility and fitness will not be the same.  
The end result of  the argument in these two sections is this: cultural transmission 
of preferences does not guarantee that preferences will serve either Darwinian fitness or 
human well -being. Everything depends on the nature of the mechanisms by which 
preferences are cultur ally transmitted. If preferences pass from mind to mind through a 
mechanism that relies  solely on a criterion of well -being, then culture will translate the 
well-being criterion into a utility criterion. If preferences pass from mind to mind through 
some o ther mechanism, then the well -being criterion may not be translated directly into a 
utility criterion. Utility may be maximized when well -being is not. The distinction 
between utility and well -being may be more than a philosophical nicety, it may be a core
element of human cultural existence.
The question now becomes, what mechanisms transmit the preferences that are of 
greatest interest to economists? Virtually all the attention in the economics literature has 
focused implicitly on the learning and direct  mechanisms, probably because these have 
the happy property of producing equivalence between utility, well -being, and fitness. 
What other mechanisms are worth examination? Can one make the case that the most 
important preferences, such as those for work, le isure, income, offices, and so on, are 
more likely to be transmitted by the direct and learning mechanisms alone? If so, then we 
can conclude that the pattern of development of these tastes over time generally coincides 
with an increase in the substantive  well-being of the human species. If not, then we face 19
the possibility that the development of preferences has not necessarily coincided with an 
increase in the substantive well -being of the human species. 
IV. Achievement Mechanisms
Utility, happiness, a nd fitness all coincide when culture transmits preferences 
solely according to happiness. Some cultural mechanisms, however, may move 
preferences from one person to another independently of either's happiness. In this 
section I argue that there is an impor tant mechanism of cultural transmission that is 
distinct from the direct and learning mechanisms, and does not rely on comparisons of 
well-being to propagate in a population: Achievement. Achievements include things like 
social status, expertise, interacti on, fame, and competitive success. This mechanism 
transmit preferences by a social achievement effect: all else equal, naïve agents (meaning 
those with as -yet unformed tastes) are more likely to adopt the preferences of successful 
people in society. Achiev ements in human society give those who have achieved a 
disproportionate influence on the processes of enculturation; this then creates a bias in the 
enculturation process towards tastes for achievement. Specific examples are described 
below.
Social Status.  A taste is encouraged by status achievements if agents are more 
inclined to adopt the taste if its owner has high status in the social system. It is axiomatic 
among anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists that people tend to imitate those 
who hav e social prestige. If such a status mechanism is operating in a culture, it means 
that naïve agents look to those with high status or prestige and tend to mimic their 
preferences. They may be inclined to adopt the preferences of happier people, all else 20
equal, but they also are inclined to adopt the preferences of more prestigious people, all 
else equal. It may be the case that they would choose the preferences of a comparatively 
unhappy yet prestigious person if the prestige level is sufficiently high. 
As an example, suppose there are two brothers who are exactly alike except that 
one has an extremely intense love of public speaking, and the other has an extremely 
intense love of solitude and silence. The first will pursue opportunities to speak with all 
resources at his disposal; the second will avoid speaking to others at all costs. Given their 
efforts, it is reasonable to assume both are largely successful in their pursuits and manage 
to structure their lives according to their wishes: the public brother  has an illustrious 
speaking career, the private brother becomes an utterly unknown and isolated man. Both 
are blissful. As a result, naïve agents will be inclined to copy the preferences of both 
brothers. The public brother, however, has far more social s tatus and prestige. If status 
affects the adoption of tastes, the public brother will pass his tastes to more naïve agents 
than the private brother does. Thus, the taste for oratory has an evolutionary advantage 
over the taste for silence. The status mecha nism gives it extra weight in transmission. In 
the next generation, their will be more people with a taste for oratory than if happiness 
were the only criterion by which naïve agents chose.
Expertise. Expertise achievements encourage a taste if agents are  inclined to 
adopt the taste when its owner seems to have more understanding of important things. 
Under the expertise mechanism, naïve individuals tend to imitate those who seem to be 
knowledgeable. Suppose, for example, that a woman in a village has an int ense desire to 
perform experiments with plants. In pursuing these interests, she obtains expertise in 
treating illnesses with plant -based compounds. If the expertise mechanism is operating in 21
this society, the fact that she is now perceived as knowledgeabl e about an important 
thing, medicine, will cause some naïve agents to copy her preferences (whether they find 
her happier or not). Thus, the expertise mechanism favors a taste for acquiring 
knowledge, at the expense of a taste for remaining uninformed. 
Interaction. Interaction achievements encourage a taste if agents tend to adopt 
the tastes of those whom they encounter more often. Under this kind of mechanism, a 
naïve agent may put disproportionate weight on the fact that a certain type is encountered 
more frequently in her culture. As an example, suppose that a village of 100 people has 
80 people with a strong taste for hunting and 20 people with a strong taste for farming. If 
children are encultured only by their parents or by adults chosen at random, 80  percent of 
each generation will be hunters. Suppose, however, that those with a taste for hunting go 
off and hunt for months, while those with a taste for farming stay home and farm. As a 
result, there are 20 farmers and only 10 hunters in the village at  any one time. Children, 
who always stay home, are exposed to a non -random grouping of adults for enculturation, 
and the groupings systematically favor the taste for farming. As a result, more than 20 
percent of the next generation will have a taste for far ming. The interaction mechanism 
will encourage a preference for any activity that increases the rate of contact among 
people. It will discourage tastes for solitude.
Fame. Achievements of fame encourage a taste if carriers of that taste are able to 
project their personality more broadly, and if other agents are inclined to adopt the tastes 
of those who are known to many others. Fame differs from interaction in that interaction 
measures how often a person encounters others in two -way interactions, whereas fa me 
measures how many people receive a person's one -way broadcasts. The fame mechanism 22
would favor a taste for public speaking in much the same way as the status mechanism 
does. If naïve agents tend to mimic the tastes of those who are famous (whether or no t 
those people are happy or prestigious), the fame achievement will encourage the spread 
of tastes for activities that generate fame. It would not encourage silence.
Competitive Success . Winning a compe encourages a taste if agents are inclined 
to adopt th e tastes of people who have emerged from a competitive process to obtain 
certain offices, and victory is regulated by the taste itself. Cavalli -Sforza and Feldman 
(1981) construct a theory of oblique cultural transmission with agents competing to enter 
offices through which they may enculture the children of others. Boyd and Richerson 
(1985, p. 179ff) give an example in terms of abstract reasoning skills. Suppose there is a 
town where teaching jobs are scarce and pay very well, so that there is intense 
competition to become a teacher. Moreover, suppose that candidates must pass a difficult 
test to obtain a teaching job, and that the test has a strong algebra component. Mr. 
Castronova happens to have a strong taste for algebra, and so he does well on the test  and 
becomes a teacher. Being a teacher, Mr. Castronova now has disproportionate influence 
on the enculturation of the next generation. If students tend to imitate their teachers' 
preferences with greater frequency than they imitate the preferences of, say , meat 
inspectors, then the teachers' disproportionate love of algebra will translate into a 
disproportionate love of algebra among the children. Thus, competition encourages 
preferences that help people win competitions for those offices that heavily infl uence 
culture.
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Each of these examples emerges from the same basic logic: cultural evolution will 
favor preferences that can more easily propagate themselves in human minds. In the 23
jungle of human minds, the entity "a taste for oratory" is better able to s urvive than the 
entity "a taste for silence." The former is more fruitful than the latter; it presents itself 
with far greater frequency to the population of naïve and unencultured carrier minds. 
These more extensive contacts generate more extensive conver sions among the carriers, 
and thus the taste for oratory reproduces itself more rapidly. 
It is important to recall that the functioning of an achievement mechanism is 
distinct from considerations of human well -being. The demagogue may be a deeply 
unhappy  man, but he is heard; no one hears the voice of the lonely hermit, happy though 
he may be. In a world without achievement mechanisms, the happiness of hermits would 
eventually make a taste for solitude dominant in the population. With achievement 
mechanisms, however, the hermits' taste for solitude will dominate only to the extent that 
their joy, in its intensity, can overcome the status and fame of the demagogues. In some 
cases it will do so, and all the population will love solitude. In other cases it wil l not, and 
the population will have a mix of tastes, or perhaps everyone will have a taste for 
demagoguery. Achievement mechanisms do not guarantee the dominance of the tastes 
they favor; they do make such dominance possible, however.
Are achievement mecha nisms independent of Darwinian fitness? What explains 
their existence? According to one argument already given, we cannot really know 
whether any feature of culture is biologically adaptive. Common experience suggests, 
however, that status, fame, competiti on and the like are nearly universal attributes of 
human societies, from the hunter -gatherers on up to the digital proto -societies that thrive 
in cyberspace. Achievement mechanisms may or may not serve Darwinian fitness, but 
they do seem to exist in most h uman societies.
16 The point here is only that where they 24
exist, they will influence preferences in a way that is both inherently interesting for its 
effects on well -being, as well as distinct from the mechanisms that rely on payoffs that 
now dominate the li terature.
V. The Evolution of Tastes for Work
This section presents a simple model of cultural evolution that illustrates the 
relationship between the achievement mechanism, utility, and well -being. Suppose we 
have a society of N individuals, indexed i =  1, … N, each having a happiness function 
(1)  i i i L y h ln ) 1 ( ln ln 0 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
where h is happiness, y is income, L is leisure time, and  ￿0, which lies between zero and 
one, is a parameter showing how the mix of leisure and income translate s into human 
happiness. We assume that  ￿0 is the result of biological evolution; every person in society 
is hardwired to be happiest when equation (1) is maximized. 
Leisure and work must be chosen with respect to the following budget constraint, 
assumed t o be the same for all people:
(2)  wT wL y i i ￿ ￿
where w is the wage rate and T is the time endowment. We will normalize the problem so 
that T = 1. Hence
(3)  w wL y i i ￿ ￿
Under these assumptio ns, the bundle L
*
0 = 1 -￿0 and y
*
0 =  ￿0w will result in the 
maximum happiness for each agent. 25
Suppose, however, that each person’s actions are determined by a different 
function, namely, the utility function: 
(4)  i i i i i L y u ln ) 1 ( ln ln ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
where u is utility and  ￿I reflects individual i’s taste for income relative to leisure. Each 
person chooses leisure and work to maximize (4) with respect to the budget constraint. 
Hence the utility -maximizing bundle is L
*
i = 1 -￿i and y
*
i =  ￿iw. This i s the bundle that 
agents actually choose. It would be the happiness -maximizing bundle if and only if the 
agents happened to be endowed with the preference parameter  ￿i =  ￿0. The research 
question thus boils down to whether there are cultural processes that  endow some or most 
agents with a preference parameter other than  ￿0. If not, then culture ensures that 
happiness and utility coincide. If so, culture ensures that happiness and utility do not 
coincide; our culture induces us to pursue goals that will only  make us unhappy.
Suppose there are two types of preferences in the society, type g (grasshoppers) 
and type a (ants), with  ￿g <  ￿a. As in the fable, ants work harder and have higher incomes 
than grasshoppers.
17 Define the  misery index  m i as follows:
(5)  ),( ) , ( 0 0 ii i L y h L y h m ￿￿  
The misery index measures how unhappy individual i becomes when pursuing her goals, 
as defined by her utility function. For example, suppose  ￿0 = 0.5, so that y 0 = 0.5w and 
L0 = 0.5. A person with  ￿i = 0.5 would c hoose these bundles and would achieve 
maximum happiness. A person with  ￿i  = 0.75, however, would choose y i = 0.75w and L i
= 0.25 and would not achieve maximum happiness. We quantify the distance between the 
latter person’s happiness and maximal happiness  as m i = [ 0.5ln(0.5w) + 0.5ln(0.5) ]  – [ 26
0.5ln(0.75w) + 0.5ln(0.25) ]. Persons with high values of m are assumed to be unhappy 
and have low levels of well - being. Furthermore, the misery index is assumed to be 
comparable across people, so that if one person  has a higher value of m than another, that 
person is assumed to be less happy. For concreteness, let y 0 =  ￿gw and L 0 = 1  - ￿g, so that 
the grasshoppers attain maximum happiness at the maximum of their utility. Hence, m g = 
0 by assumption, while m a > 0. Th ere is no loss of generality by this assumption; one 
could just as easily assume that ants were generally happier than grasshoppers and 
analyze cultural selection on ants.
A. Cultural transmission based on well -being alone
From the standpoint of well -being, it would be desirable if the cultural 
transmission mechanism were to favor grasshoppers over ants. Grasshoppers are happier. 
To specify the cultural transmission process, consider the following life cycle for each 
person. A person is born to a single pa rent and raised by that parent.
18 At the age of 
maturity, the young person is assumed to have the parent's preferences with probability 1 
- p. With probability p, the young person is considered to be still naïve after parental 
influence, and will be encultu red by someone other than her parent. 
Assume the society is divided into two groups according to type, so that a person 
raised by a grasshopper, but not yet encultured as a grasshopper, is more likely to be 
exposed to grasshoppers than ants in the wider w orld. Let the fraction of the population 
who are grasshoppers be denoted s. Let the probability that someone raised in one group 
encounters an adult from another group be denoted  ￿, so that the probability of a naïve 
ant child meeting a grasshopper adult w ould be  ￿s, with 0 <  ￿ < 1. (Later we will relax 27
the assumption the both groups have the same values of p and  ￿). Similarly, the 
probability that a naïve grasshopper child meets an ant adult is  ￿(1-s). 
Suppose that the enculturation process is as follows:  a naïve child meets an adult 
of a given type with the probabilities above, and will adopt that adult's value of  ￿ with a 
probability that depends on the adult's characteristics. Otherwise the child adopts the 
other value of  ￿. Again for concreteness, assu me that children who encounter adults 
whose type is the same as their parents will adopt their parent's type with probability 1. 
Thus, a child will switch only if she encounters an adult of different type. Let the 
probability that a grasshopper child who m eets an ant adult will adopt the  ￿a preference 
be given by the following formula:
(6)  ) ( ) | Pr( g a a m m r grasshoppe ant ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
where  ￿' < 0. The corresponding probability for conversion to grasshopper is  ￿(mg – m a).  
(In simulations will we assume tha t  ￿ is a linear function of the misery difference. As a 
result, with probabilities being bounded below at zero, we will be assuming that  ￿ is zero 
when the other type is less happy than the child's parent's type. Conversions into the 
relatively unhappier t ype never happen, and conversions into the relatively happier type 
are less likely if the misery difference is small.)
So far we have established a framework that is similar to the payoff -based 
evolution models that are common in the literature. Indeed, if  equation (8) were defined 
in terms of payoffs instead of well -being, we would be able to derive a replicator 
dynamic: types with higher utility would grow in the population, while those with lower 
utility would die off (see Weibull, 1995). Here, however,  the probability of switching 28
depends on well -being, and there is no inherent connection between the payoffs and the 
criterion of switching. 
The dynamic that emerges from (8) can be derived as follows. Let s 0 denote the 
fraction of the population who are g rasshoppers in generation 0. The fraction in 
generation 1, s 1, is determined by summing four factors:
￿ The percentage of grasshoppers who are not exposed to anyone but their 
parents is (1 -p)s0. This leaves ps 0 grasshopper children to be encultured by 
others.
￿ Of them, a fraction 1  - ￿(1  – s 0) encounter other grasshopper adults and 
receive the  ￿g preference.
￿ The remaining  ￿ (1  – s 0) of grasshopper children who are encultured by 
other adults are encountered by adult ants. The probability that they switch 
from gr asshopper to ant is given by  ￿a. Hence the probability that they will 
not switch, but will retain the grasshopper preference, will be (1  - ￿a).
￿ Finally, of the 1  – s 0  ant children, a fraction 1  - p will be encultured as 
ants by their parents. The remainin g p(1  – s 0) ant children will encounter 
grasshopper adults with probability  ￿s0. The probability that they will 
switch from ant to grasshopper is given by  ￿g. 
The frequency of  ￿g in generation 1 depends on its frequency in generation 0 as follows:
(7)  g a s s p s ps s ps s p s ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( )) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
If we define  s ￿ = s 1 – s 0 as the growth in s per generation, we can simplify (9) to 
(8)  ] )[ 1 ( 0 0 ag p p s s s ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿29
Define the term B = p ￿￿g - p ￿￿a as the  net conversion rat e, the rate at which children are 
converting from ant to grasshopper (B > 0) or from grasshopper to ant (B < 0). The net 
conversion rate decreases as parents have more influence over their children's culture (p) 
and as groups are more insular ( ￿). 
In the  terminology of evolutionary theory, the system is at an evolutionary 
equilibrium at a point s
* if s
* is an asymptotically stable fixed point of (9) (Gintis, 2000, 
p. 173). Equation (10) reaches a fixed point when  s ￿ is zero, at s 0 = 0  and s 0 = 1. When s 0
is not equal to 0 or 1,  s ￿ is positive if and only if B > 0. In this case, s 0 = 1 is an 
asymptotically stable fixed point while s 0 = 0 is an asymptotically unstable fixed point; 
the only asymptotic equilibrium of th e system is s = 1. If B < 0, then  s ￿ < 0 whenever s 0
lies between 0 and 1, which would make s 0 = 0 the asymptotic equilibrium. 
Since we have assumed that children choose preferences according to happiness, 
and grasshoppers are happier , it will be the case that  ￿g >  ￿a and therefore B > 0. The 
point s
* = 1 is asymptotically stable and is therefore the evolutionary equilibrium for the 
system. In other words, the fact that grasshoppers are happier than ants means that 
children systematica lly choose to adopt  ￿g over  ￿a. The frequency of grasshoppers grows 
with each generation. Over time, the  ￿ a preference will eventually die out. Even if the 
rate of enculturation by non -parents is very small, and both communities are very insular 
(so that p  and  ￿ are small), the eventual extinction of the unhappy ants is assured. 
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics. It is based on a simulation of the model with a 
set of standard parameters (some of which have been set to zero and will not be discussed 
here, b ut are introduced in later sections). The graph shows values of  s ￿ ("Change in s") 
as a function of the current level of s ("s0"). The simulation assumes that p =  ￿ = 0.3, 30
which implies that, if each group makes up 50 percent of the po pulation, a child from one 
group will be exposed for enculturation to an adult of the other group with probability 
(0.3)*(0.3)*(0.5) = 0.045. That is, more than 95 percent of the children from each group 
will never face the possibility of switching type; w hich is to say, this simulation assumes 
only a minimal amount of cross -group enculturation. 
The figures in the graph assume that  ￿g = ¼ and  ￿a = ¾, as well as w = 0.4. 
Grasshoppers prefer more leisure and less income than ants do. Because we have 
assumed  that well -being is highest at the grasshoppers' mix of work and income, the 
misery index for grasshoppers is 0 by assumption, while for ants it is m a = 0.19. The 
simulation further assumes that  ￿i =  -qh*(mi – m -i), where m -i is the misery index of the 
other type and the parameter q h is set to the value 3. If  -q h*(mi – m -i) < 0,  ￿i is assumed to 
be zero. Hence, we have  ￿a = 0 and  ￿g = 0.57. The net conversion rate thus favors 
grasshoppers, with B = 0.05172. The point at issue is whether the preferences of th e 
unhappy ants can survive the process of cultural transmission.
In the figure, the  s ￿ function has zeros at two points, s0 = 0 and s0 = 1. Between 
these two values, the function is always positive, meaning that s is growing. This impl ies 
that the system is unstable at s0 = 0: when everyone is an ant, a mutation that produces a 
small number of grasshoppers will not die out. The higher well -being of grasshoppers 
will cause the conversion of some number of ant children, and the process wi ll continue 
until everyone is a grasshopper. Conversely, if everyone is a grasshopper (s0 = 1), a 
mutation that produces a small number of ants will die out as the unhappy ant children 
are systematically converted to being grasshoppers, with the system eve ntually returning 
to s0 = 1. 31
This example illustrates the possibility that cultural evolution can make utility and 
well-being equivalent. Because preferences are chosen only according to a well -being 
criterion, the preferences that eventually survive are  those whose maximization also 
maximizes well -being. If happiness is the selection criterion, then cultural evolution 
ensures that utility  – the guide to behavior – will also be the guide to happiness. 
B. Cultural transmission with achievement bias
Suppose now, following the argument in Section IV, that cultural transmission is 
affected by achievement mechanisms in addition to the simple enculturation process just 
described. For concreteness, assume that the status mechanism has some influence on the 
way t hat preferences are transmitted. This would mean that young people, when deciding 
whether to be ants or grasshoppers, would pay attention not only to the happiness of their 
cultural models but also to their status. In the context of the model here, we will  assume 
that income is the metric of status: people with more money have more prestige, so 
people with more money are more likely to enculture the naïve with their tastes.
Thus, in the model, a child adopts her parent's tastes with probability 1  – p and is
exposed to other adults with probability p. Among these other adults, the unencultured 
child encounters someone from the other group depending on the population frequency of 
that group, as well as a group isolation factor  ￿ < 1. If the unencultured chil d from group 
-i does meet an adult from group i, the probability that she adopts the tastes of that person 
is  ￿i, and let it be a function of the incomes of the two types as well as their happiness:
(9)  ) ( ) ( i i h i i y i m m q y y q ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿32
where q y > 0 and q h > 0 are w eights defining the relative influence of the income and 
happiness components, respectively, on the adoption probability.
19 The assumption that 
income influences the adoption of tastes (q y > 0) can be justified empirically, since, in 
virtually all human soc ieties, people with more money have more prestige, and prestige 
affects the adoption of tastes.
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There is a much broader justification, however. Even if some societies do not 
confer prestige on the rich, prestige exists in all societies and can be obtaine d through 
effort. This model describes how people make choices of effort toward some intrinsically 
rewarding goal, denoted y, and then asks what happens to the preferences of the young 
when those who achieve that goal, y, also receive prestige or any other  resource that may 
make them more attractive as models for the young. It is not necessary, but rather seems 
to make the most intuitive sense, to think of the goal "y" as income.
One can further justify a focus on income because it is relevant for almost a ny 
achievement mechanism one can imagine. Income seems to raise status, as assumed 
above; it also seems to increase fame, the frequency of face -to-face interactions, one's 
ability to occupy competitive offices, and even expertise.
As for fame, in most soci eties the views and opinions of a person are more likely 
to be broadcast to groups of others, ceteris paribus, if that person is wealthier. The typical 
college professor has often sat through lengthy speeches of wealthy donors to the 
graduating class; how  often has the speaker been poor? In post -industrial societies, the 
wealthy are the focus of intense media scrutiny, and for them, obscurity has become an 
extremely precious good. It is the CEO who speaks to the assembled employees, not the 
mail clerk, and  the national evening news is written, edited, and read by people whose 33
incomes are well above average. Artists choose whether to produce for themselves or the 
masses; those who produce for the masses have more money (Cowen and Tabarrok, 
2000). There is alm ost certainly a positive correlation between income and fame. 
As for interactions, achieving high income typically makes a person commit 
herself to a life of social interactions: networking, career -building, and mobility. True, 
some people make a good dea l of money by writing screenplays or playing chess on their 
home computers, but on average, a person has to socially active to be wealthy. Studies of 
social capital emphasize the social isolation of the poor (Wilson, 1987; Putnam, 1995). 
Career success inv olves a willingness to move geographically and also socially, so that 
the typical wealthy person will have moved through many more social circles than the 
typical poor person. The internet greatly facilitates personal interactions, and the typical 
internet user is wealthier than the typical non- user. Income and interaction go together.
As for competition mechanisms, gaining an office under competitive 
circumstances is almost certainly affected by the resources one brings to the conflict. If 
two 10- year-old  children both share the goal of becoming 3
rd grade teachers, which one is 
more likely to do so, all else equal: the one from a wealthy family or the one from a poor 
family? In contemporary societies, education and training are key components in office 
competition, and they both are expensive. Moreover, networking affects the selection of 
people for positions, and there can be little doubt that networking is a top -down 
phenomenon: the more successful, powerful, and (by correlation) wealthier the 
recommender, the more influential his recommendation. And who is more likely to be 
recommended by a successful, powerful, and rich mentor, all else equal: a rich person or 
a poor person? And is the average income of elected officials higher or lower than the 34
population average? Income helps a person gain access to all positions in society, and this 
will include offices that have some impact on the enculturation of youth. 
Finally, even expertise is correlated with income. Becoming an expert on some 
important matter req uires education and training, which, again, costs money. Or one can 
obtain expertise with life experience, but here again the wealthy have more resources to 
travel the globe and do the things that broaden one's understanding of the human 
condition. Achievi ng the reputation of being an expert on some topic almost certainly is 
affected by wealth.
Thus, all of the achievement mechanisms can be invoked to motivate the idea that 
people with higher incomes are more likely to enculture others. And, as was mentione d 
above, the central assumption here does not really involve income at all. The central idea 
is actually effort. In the model, people who do not work will not achieve status, fame, 
interactions, competitive offices, or expertise. As a result, they will hav e less influence on 
the tastes of the next generation. The item "y" that translates work into cultural influence 
is most intuitively thought of as income, but that is not necessary. More accurately, y is 
any kind of resource that a) is obtained through eff ort, b) is an element of a person's 
utility and well -being, but is not the sole element of either, and c) confers status, fame, 
interactions, competitive office, or expertise. Any number of things might fit these 
conditions, including income but also thing s like knowledge, mass communications, and 
power. Power, for example, requires effort, is directly enjoyed by those who have it, and 
confers status, fame, and competitive offices in virtually all human societies. In any case, 
the point is that those who ha ve tastes for such things as knowledge, mass 
communication, power, and income will devote more effort to obtaining them than those 35
who do not have such tastes; those who obtain knowledge, mass communication, power, 
and income will also achieve status, fame , encounters, offices, and expertise; and those 
who have such achievements will have more influence on the tastes of the next 
generation than those who do not. The model simply reduces all of this to the 
assumptions that a) work produces income and b) inco me affects cultural transmission. 
This allows us to explore in a simple fashion the impact of cultural transmission on well -
being.
Figure 2 shows the result of simulating the same model as above, with the 
addition now of an income effect in the adoption pr obability  ￿. The two parameters q y
and q h have been set to 4 and 3 respectively. As in Figure 1, population growth is zero at 
two points, s0 = 0 and s0 = 1, but now the only asymptotic equilibrium is at s0 = 0. The 
presence of the status mechanism makes th e net conversion rate from ant to grasshopper 
negative: B =  -0.02028. In each generation, there is a net outflow from the grasshopper 
population to the ant population, so that the only stable point involves zero grasshoppers. 
Everyone is an ant  - and less  happy than they would be if they were grasshoppers.
In the presence of an achievement mechanism, a taste for behavior that lowers 
well-being can flourish. "Achievement bias" occurs when an achievement mechanism is 
so strong that the resulting pattern of pr eferences produces a level of well -being that is 
below the maximum. One could quantify the achievement bias as the aggregate of 
deviations of each person's well -being (however measured) from his maximum. In this 
model, well -being is measured by the misery  index, and each person, being an ant, is 0.19 
points from his optimum. If there are 1,000 people in the society, the achievement bias 
produced by the introduction of the status mechanism would be (1,000)(0.19) = 190. One 36
assesses the value or harm of a cul tural transmission mechanism by the amount of 
achievement bias it causes or removes.
The point of the simulation is that things like the status mechanism introduce a 
force that competes with well -being in influencing the evolution of preferences. If the 
competing force is strong, it may bias preferences away from activities that make people 
happy. The presence of achievement mechanisms is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for achievement bias, however. If the status mechanism is weak (say, with q y =
1 instead of 4), it may not dominate the effect of well - being. 
This result does not depend on the insularity of society. Suppose that the ants and 
grasshoppers are insulated from one another to a different degree, so that the values of p 
and  ￿ differ for  the two groups. The net conversion rate is now expressed as
(10) a g g g a a p p B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
In particular, suppose that adult ants are able to keep to themselves, so that naïve young 
grasshoppers only rarely encounter them. One might th ink of the harder -working and 
richer ants as being able to close off their world from less wealthy outsiders. As a result, 
the parameter  ￿g will be lower than  ￿a. Young ants go out into the world, see more of it, 
and hence have a higher chance of meeting p eople who are different; young grasshoppers 
go out into the world but remain locked within their own culture, and have less chance of 
meeting people who are different. This encourages conversions of ants to grasshoppers 
but discourages conversions in the o ther direction; it raises B. Figure 3 shows the effect: 
at all values of s0 between 0 and 1, B is still negative (we continue to assume q y = 4 and 
qh = 3) but now smaller in absolute value. It follows that differential degrees of social 
isolation can slow  the rate of convergence to the unhappy equilibrium. Moreover, if they 37
were sufficiently strong, social isolation effects could swamp achievement effects. For 
example, perhaps young grasshoppers never even see ants, so  ￿g = 0, B > 0, and s
* = 1 as 
in Figure  1. But the sufficiency point remains: a status mechanism  may cause unhappy 
tastes to flourish, under certain parameters, even if those who hold those tastes isolate 
themselves to a significant degree. 
C. Mid -life corrections and natural selection
To th is point, the model has ignored two important aspects of cultural reality. The 
first is the fact that the tastes one receives in youth may change in the course of life. 
Becker's (1996) work studies this phenomenon extensively. The second is the fact that 
choices affect health, and mortality affects the pool of people who can pass culture on to 
others.
To bring in these factors, let us add another stage to the life cycle. In the previous 
sections, the life cycle has two stages: one is born and is encultured , then one becomes an 
adult and encultures others. Now we assume that birth and enculturation is followed by a 
time period in which one does not enculture others. In this period, a person may devote 
time to modifying her own preferences. She may also die.  Those who survive this period 
carry their preferences, which may or may not have changed, on to the third stage, during 
which they transmit their tastes to young people of the next generation. 
The transmission of preferences follows the same rules as bef ore, so that
(11) 
where s 0' is the fraction of grasshoppers in the population after mid -life conversion and 
mortality. This fraction is determined by the frequency of grasshoppers in generation 0:
] )[ 1 ( 0 0 0 1 ag p p s s s s ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿38
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where z c is the probability that an ant will convert to grasshopper in mid -life, and z x is the 
probability that a grasshopper will die before reaching the last stage of life. We assume 
that z c is a function of the differential happiness of t he two groups, while z x is a function 
of the differential income of the two groups. 
As for the first, the intuition is that well -being is eventually the dominant factor in 
the way people mold their own preferences. Given enough time, every person would be
able to give themselves a utility function whose maximization also gave them the highest 
level of emotional satisfaction. Over time, people gradually learn which goals they have 
pursued in the past lead in fact to deeper well -being and which do not. Thus,  mid -life 
corrections should typically be toward more happy states. In the context of this model, 
grasshoppers are always happier than ants, so we should allow some ants to switch to 
grasshopper in mid -life. (It is not necessary to allow conversions in the  other direction, 
since they would not occur unless some criterion other than well -being were to cause 
them.) 
As for differential mortality, the intuition comes from the fact that health status is 
strongly correlated with income. Medical care is a costly  good and access to it is often 
regulated by price. Even if it is not, however, mortality may differ because of behavioral 
effects, as poorer people have lower self -esteem and more destructive habits. Wealthier 
people have more access to health education an d medical know -how. Even though 
income is often associated with hard work and stress, studies show that the net effect of 
income on health is beneficial (see Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000, and the references 39
therein). Thus, in the model, we would want to assu me that some grasshoppers die early, 
and that this depends on their incomes.
We add these aspects to the model in the following way. First, we assume that 
mid-life conversions of ants to grasshoppers is determined by
(13) )] ( [ g a h c m m q c z ￿ ￿
The term inside the brackets is the weight received by happiness in the conversion 
probability of young ants to grasshopper, and c is a parameter (0 < c < 1). The idea is that 
by mid -life the probability of conversion depends entirely on happin ess, so that q y is zero. 
However, in later life a person can be caught in a net of social obligations and norms, and 
no longer has the same freedom of thought and action as in youth. Moreover, the process 
of changing one's own tastes can be difficult and t ime - consuming, so adults will be less 
likely, ceteris paribus, to seek change as they age. The conversion probability is therefore 
reduced by the factor c. 
Second, the differential mortality of grasshoppers is given by
(14) ) ( g a x y y x z ￿ ￿
where x is a parameter. Here the idea is that relative deprivation has the strongest effect 
on health status (Wilkinson, 1996; Eibner, 2001). The mortality factor x is positive and 
may be smaller or larger than one, depending on the units o f income. In the simulation 
here I initially choose x so that the conversion and mortality probabilities are about the 
same.
The main effect of adding an intermediate life stage is that the stable, zero - growth 
points of the system are no longer at 0 and 1.  The  s ￿ function becomes40
(15) Bs z s z s s z s z s s z s z s x c x c x c ) ) 1 ( 1 )( ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
This is a quadratic equation that does not reduce to s 0(1-s0). 
Figure 4 shows how the addition of conversion and mortality affects the 
simulation. The conver sion factor c = 0.2, while the mortality factor x = 0.5. As a result, 
the probability of mid -life conversion of ants to grasshopper is 11 percent, while the 
death rate of grasshoppers is 10 percent. The status mechanism is still active, with q y = 4 
as befo re. For the particular parameters in Figure 4, the zeroes of (17) are 0.51 and 17.66. 
The first of these can be seen in the figure; the  s ￿ function is positive when s 0 is less than 
0.51, and negative when s 0 is above 0.51; the frequenc y of grasshoppers grows when it is 
below 0.51 and falls when it is above that level.  Thus, s
* = 0.51 is an asymptotic 
equilibrium of the system. 
Relative to Figure 2, we see that adding differential mortality and mid -life 
conversions shifts the equilibri um from s = 0 to s = 0.51; not all grasshoppers die out, 
despite the bias introduced by the status mechanism. On the other hand, the unhappy ants 
do not die out either. Instead, with the added realism in the model, the population comes 
to rest with an even  mix of the two types. At this equilibrium, 49 percent of the 
population has a misery index of 0.19; for a population of 1,000, the measure of 
achievement bias would be 93.1. Achievement bias exists even when one accounts for 
mid-life corrections and natur al selection.
Figure 5 shows the impact of a change in the status mechanism under these more 
realistic conditions. We have reduced the status mechanism's power by lowering q y from 
4 to 1. The equilibrium shifts upward to s
* = 0.57. Now only 43 percent of t he population 
consists of unhappy ants, and the metric of achievement bias falls from 93.1 to 81.7. In 41
other words, the system responds in plausible ways to changes in cultural transmission 
mechanisms: if you reduce the influence of the status mechanism, c ultural evolution will 
increase the number of happy people. 
This simulated society responds plausibly to variations in the other parameters. If 
we make grasshoppers more likely to be encultured by their parents (raising p g), the 
equilibrium shifts upward ; if we make the same assumption for ants, it shifts downward. 
If the differential mortality of grasshoppers rises, the equilibrium involves fewer 
grasshoppers; if more mid -life ants convert to grasshopper, the equilibrium involves 
fewer ants. Changes in t he overall permeability of society (p a, p g,  ￿a,  ￿g) do not change 
the equilibrium point (so long as both groups are equally permeable), but do change the 
rate at which society converges to it. As one alters parameters, it is of course possible to 
produce v irtually any mix of ants and grasshoppers as a social equilibrium. This only 
strengthens the basic point, however, which is that it is not necessarily the case that 
cultural evolution always eliminates preferences that lower well -being. Rather, it is easy,
in almost any parameter set, to find an alteration which results in an equilibrium with 
lower well -being. 
Other than this, the wage parameter deserves closer attention. Over time, 
technological progress and economic growth could raise the wage rate. Fig ure 6 shows 
the effect on tastes. It uses the parameters of Figure 4, except that the wage of 0.4 is 
doubled to 0.8.  The equilibrium frequency of grasshoppers falls from 0.51 to 0.35. As 
wages rise, the opportunity cost of leisure rises. Ants and grasshop pers both work more, 
but ants, with their greater utility of income, do so disproportionately. Even though the 
difference in tastes between the two groups has not changed, the income gap between 42
them widens. As a result, the impact of the status mechanism  increases: the increased gap 
in income also widens the differences in status, and makes the higher status of the ants 
more apparent and more worthy of emulation. Moreover, the income gap makes ants 
relatively still more effective than grasshoppers at survi ving to the third stage of life, so 
that the differential mortality of grasshoppers rises. Finally, the widening income gap 
makes ants more unhappy than they were (we continue to assume that grasshoppers are at 
the bliss point), which makes mid - life conver sions more likely.
21 The net effect of these 
changes is to lower the frequency of grasshoppers. Thus, one can construct a model with 
plausible parameters and mechanisms in which technological progress increases the 
number of unhappy people in society. Incre ases in per capita income can be consistent 
with lower well -being. Again, this is not an argument that such an outcome is necessary, 
only that it is possible.
D. Group selection
Within a given society, then, cultural transmission systems do not necessari ly 
select only for tastes that raise well -being. Different societies may have different 
parameters and therefore different combinations of happiness, income, and leisure; in 
some cultures, everyone may be a grasshopper, in others everyone is an ant; in sti ll others 
there may be a mix of types. 
Suppose the world consists of a very large number of separate societies. There is 
no migration across them.
22 Each society is endowed with unique parameters governing 
its cultural transmission processes, its economic  development, and so on. As a result, 
each society i has a population frequency of grasshoppers s i.43
Now suppose that the societies are subject to evolutionary pressures themselves. 
Perhaps resources are so limited that some of the groups run out of essent ial goods and 
die off. Perhaps they engage in war. To model group selection in the context of the 
income and leisure model, we have to make some assumptions about the way that the 
selection mechanism chooses which groups survive. 
Generally speaking, the s ocieties in this model are characterized by different 
mixes of income, leisure, and happiness. Given this, the most plausible selection 
mechanism would seem to be that societies with more income are more likely to survive 
than others.
23 If survival depends  on the possession of material goods, then it is income, 
and not leisure or happiness, that would determine fitness. In the fable, the grasshoppers 
get hungry and weak when the winter comes; perhaps they die. And if survival depends 
on war, only income matt ers. In the fable, the industrious ant shares some of his abundant 
resources with the weakened grasshopper, but that is why it is a fable. If the ants acted 
like real humans instead of imaginary insects, they would more likely wait for the 
grasshoppers to  weaken and then push them off their land, killing most and leaving the 
rest to starve. If group selection operates at all, it seems most likely to operate on incomes 
rather than leisure or well -being.
We will assume that the probability that a group survi ves from one period to the 
next is given by Pr(survival | y i) =  ￿yi, where y i is the per capita income of the society in 
question, and  ￿ > 0. Suppose there are two types of societies in the world, type j and type 
k, with equilibrium grasshopper frequencies  of s j and s k respectively. Let the j type 
society have more grasshoppers, hence s j > s k. If wage levels in the two societies are 
sufficiently close, this will imply that y j < y k.
24 When extinction occurs, new societies are 44
formed as colonies from the exist ing societies, in proportion to the current mix of those 
societies. Thus, if f 0 is the frequency of type j societies in period 0, then the probability 
that an extinct society is replaced by a new society of type j is f 0, and the probability it is 
replaced  by a society of type k is (1 -f0).
The dynamics of the system are given by
(16) 0 0
2
0 0 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ff y f y f y f k j j ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The first term is the number of type j societies that survive, the second is the number of 
type j societies that become extinct bu t are replaced by another type j society, and the 
third is the number of type k societies that become extinct and are replaced by a type j 
society. The dynamics reduce to
(17) ) )( 1 ( 0 0 kj y y f f f ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The term  ￿yj - ￿yk is negative, wh ich means that the asymptotic equilibrium of the system 
is f
* = 0. Group selection annihilates grasshoppers.
It would be no less difficult to build simple models of group selection in which 
some grasshopper societies would survive. Such models would have  to assume that group 
selection operates at least as strongly on leisure and well -being as on income. At the level 
of individual taste selection, such assumptions make a great deal of sense. Indeed the 
societal model in the previous sections based the survi val of tastes on a complex mix of 
income, leisure, and well -being. At the level of whole societies, however, the case is 
harder to make. At times, the leaders of one society may have envied the leisure and well -
being of other societies, and may have tried  to emulate those outcomes in their own 45
society. But the envy of wealth and the respect earned by superior armies have probably 
been the more powerful force in human history. 
Ammerman and Cavalli -Sforza (1971, p. 685) present a diagram showing the 
spread o f early farming, from a presumed origin near Jericho, northwestwards to Ireland. 
The picture tells the story that between 6000 and 3000 BCE, farm societies gradually but 
inexorably replaced hunter -gatherer societies, one by one, from one end of Europe to t he 
other. They did so probably not because farming generally makes a person happier, but 
because farms produce a great deal of food with relatively low risk. 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that group selection processes would encourage the 
formation of grassho pper societies if within -group pressures were more likely to produce 
ants. If anything, group selection would further encourage the growth of ant societies.  
The possibility argument of the preceding sections seems largely immune to group 
selection process es. Even with group selection, it is still possible for tastes for 
immiserating behavior to persist in cultural equilibrium. 
VI. Implications: Progress, Civilization, Misery
The main point of the paper is that preferences for actions which lead to relat ively 
low well -being may persist in cultural equilibrium. Culture may give us goals whose 
pursuit will make us unhappy. This happens because of certain mechanisms of cultural 
transmission, related to such goals as income, power, knowledge, and mass 
communication. Pursuit of these goals gives a person a number of important social 
achievements: status, fame, offices, interactions, and expertise. People with such 
achievements broadcast their goals more loudly, and thereby amplify the importance of 46
these goals  to the young. Such goals propagate in society to the disadvantage of other 
goals. Societies populated by people with such goals generally have more wealth, more 
power, superior knowledge, and better mass communications. They dominate other 
societies and ar e envied by them. At both the societal and individual level, tastes for 
income, power, knowledge, and mass communication have an evolutionary advantage 
over other tastes. 
Great achievements build great civilizations, but they contribute only partially to 
human well -being. Happiness may require such things, but it also requires other things 
that do not enjoy similar advantages in cultural evolution. It requires good relations with 
an intimate partner, as well as with one’s children, parents, siblings, and f riends; it 
requires a sense of meaningful existence in the cosmos; it requires inner peace. Perhaps 
there are cultural mechanisms that broadcast tastes for these things as loudly as the 
achievement mechanism broadcasts tastes for wealth and power.
25 If so,  then humans 
would be developing not only ever -increasing wealth, power, knowledge, and mass 
communications, but also ever -increasingly good relations with their families, their gods, 
and themselves. This, however, seems not to be the case. 47
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1 The initial preferences are important, since they are not easy to change. In Becker's (1996) approach, one's 
preferences can only be changed through the accumulation of certain actions, which ta kes time. One of 
Shakespeare's most important contributions to human thought is the idea that self -modification only comes 
through self -understanding, and can be very difficult, time -consuming, and costly (Bloom, 1998). Finally, 
economics requires that the  agent cannot immediately change her own preferences, otherwise a preference -
based choice model would make no sense. For all of these reasons, the initial preferences at the time of 
endowment, at the end of childhood, deserve careful study. 
2 Sahlins (197 6) argues that culture shapes preferences, and therefore culture must be the start of a choice -
based theory of human behavior. He does not, however, propose any theory by which choices affect 
culture, as they certainly do.
3 Outside of economics there is a  large literature devoted to the evolution of cultural traits in general, but 
none of it focuses specifically on traits that economists would identify as preferences. In anthropology, not 
much distinction is made between a trait that gives the agent a tast e for some behavior, as opposed to a trait 
that gives the agent both the taste for the behavior and also the resources necessary to engage in it. The trait 
tends to be identified at the level of behavior; one is either a 'hell -raiser' or not (Boyd and Rich erson, 1985). 
This paper focuses instead on the agent's tastes for hell -raising, regardless of whether they in fact lead to 
rowdy behavior.
4 True, power -seeking will maximize the utility of a person emerging from childhood, but utility 
maximization and ha ppiness maximization are not the same thing. Thus, it may be the case that a person 
would devote her life to the pursuit of power, and eventually become leader, and yet find herself unhappy 
even though her utility is at its maximum. By definition, utility  always guides behavior; happiness often 
does not, as is apparent from the flourishing of the therapeutic professions. Indeed one could view the 
objective of therapy (and maturation more generally) as an ever -greater consistency between the utility 
function and the "happiness function." Many authors have argued that utility and human well -being are not 
equivalent; their arguments are critical for this paper and will be discussed in detail below.
5 The process of molding the self takes up considerable social  resources, including both time and money. 
Becker's (1996) approach to endogenous preferences is to assume that the current utility of an action 
depends on past choices. An agent could give herself a specific current utility function by accumulating 
choices accordingly. The process would take time, and, like any capital accumulation process, would 
require sacrificing goals of the moment. Thus, if changing tastes is costly, the time path of preferences 
through the life cycle will depend on initial conditions.  Moreover, if we adopt a more psychotherapeutic, 
Shakespearian view of preference change, we will have to admit that immediate convergence to a desired 
utility function may not be possible. The mind is not perfectly and immediately mutable. People do thing s 
that will make them unhappy. They continue to do them long after becoming aware of the connection. Our 
initial tastes can have very long shadows.
6 Well -being and happiness are not necessarily the same, but the distinction between them does not affect 
anything in the argument here. The point is that both are distinct from utility. 
7 Throughout the paper I will refer to fitness under natural selection (i.e. the fact that human beings who are 
more poorly adapted to their environment are more likely to die  before bearing children) as 'darwinian 
fitness' or 'biological fitness.'
8 Bisin and Verdier's (2000) paper is a recent example. The population of agents is divided into types, the 
agents play games, and the agents with the highest payoffs are more fit and  pass their type on to larger 
numbers of the succeeding generation. This leads to a dynamics in which the change in the frequency of the 
type depends on the type's current payoffs. In one mathematical form, this is called the replicator dynamics.
9 Gintis  notes that this is similar to meiotic drive, a force in biological evolution that allows organisms to 
retain attributes that are actually damaging to them.
10 I will use the terms 'happiness' and 'well -being' interchangeably throughout. Nozick (1974) argues
against the idea that human well -being is equivalent to a happy mental state, otherwise it would be 
acceptable to live life in a drugged state while hooked to an experience machine that produced nothing but 
good feelings in the brain. Such counter -examples notwithstanding, I will assume that practically speaking, 
well-being is always enhanced by increases in subjective human happiness, and that true human happiness 
is the sine qua non in human well -being. 59
11 Lottery winners are a common example: surveyed b efore and after winning, they typically exhibit modest 
increases in wealth but little or no increase in emotional satisfaction or well -being (Brickman, Coates, and 
Janoff-Bulman, 1978). Marriage has a much larger impact on happiness than income (Argyle, 19 99), yet 
the utility functions of many people, perhaps most people, and especially young people, are directed more 
toward career than relationships. True, young people do build relationships and learn about them through 
trial and error. And they also pick  up career skills through odd jobs. While such learning might be 
reasonably successful, much of it is bound to be haphazard. It is interesting to note that people find such 
unstructured learning utterly unacceptable when it comes to careers, but not when it  comes to relationships. 
They supplement their haphazard career learning with formal career training, but they do not supplement 
their haphazard relationship learning with formal relationship training. If they did, the formal education 
system would look qu ite different from the way it does at this writing. The formal education system in 
contemporary societies seems largely devoted to career and workplace preparation; aside from the 
occasional Human Sexuality class, most coursework is intended to improve ski lls that are either directly 
vocational (Drawing I, II, III for the fine arts or Accounting for pre -business) or involve general life 
preparation (Algebra; Plato). Relative to these, how much time is spent learning and honing the specific 
and well -known sk ills that intimate physical relationships require: communication, trust, openness, 
reliability, and above all, self -awareness? Could we not conceive of some kind of formal training, 
equivalent to the decades -long process of gaining familiarity with the tec hniques of language and 
mathematics, that would give people more familiarity with the techniques of self -assessment? Such 
education could exist, but it does not. Rather, young people devote years and years to formal schoolwork 
that prepares them almost exc lusively for work. Since they do this largely voluntarily, and continue well 
into their adult years, it follows that their utility functions at emergence from childhood must be maximized 
at bundles that contain excellent careers and mediocre relationships.  Unfortunately, studies of subjective 
well-being, as well as mature intuition, suggest that happiness is generally not maximized when the career 
is good and the relationship is not so good.
12 Gross and Souleles (2000) report that people often keep low -interest liquid assets  and high -interest credit 
card debts at the same time. This violates simple precepts of financial rationality. They suggest that self -
control issues are the most likely explanation. 
13 Nozick (1974) argues against such a view of substanti ve well -being. It could be satisfied by hooking 
people up to experience machines that would make them happy. Sen (1993) and many others argue that 
human well -being depends more on the kind of life a person lives rather than an emotional state. In this 
paper I will assume that whatever happiness people obtain is acquired by the living of a good life rather 
than an experience machine.
14 Ruyle (1973) argues that biological evolution has created our desire for emotional satisfaction, and this is 
how it has stru ctured our behavior. 
15 An example that hits closer to home is the influence of the tenure process. Graduate students are typically 
a random draw from the population as far as an interest in being tenured goes; they may or may not care 
about it at first. S till, those who do care about it are more likely to be tenured in the end. As a result, the 
average tenured faculty member believes tenure to be a more important thing than does the average first -
year graduate student. If senior faculty mentoring has any i nfluence on graduate students, it will, on 
average, induce them to care more about tenure than they otherwise would.
16 One could make an argument that achievement mechanisms may exist simply because culture exists. The 
capacity for culture involves the cap acity to learn from others, which implies that there must be a capacity 
to teach others. Suppose, then, that culture exists if and only if all members of the population have a basic 
desire to teach others what they know. Thus, each member of the population  has a basic urge to propagate 
her own tastes in the next generation. It follows that the famous will want children to imitate those who are 
famous, that the prestigious will want children to imitate those who have prestige, that the knowledgeable 
will wan t children to imitate those who have knowledge, and so on. Similarly, those who are unknown will 
want children to imitate the obscure, those who are humble will want children to imitate the humble, and 
those who are ignorant will want children to imitate t hose who are ignorant. However, the famous, 
prestigious, and knowledgeable people will generally enculture more children than will the obscure, 
humble, and ignorant people, simply because of the nature of fame, prestige, and knowledge in human 
society. Hen ce the achievement mechanisms may exist simply because ego is a basic human drive: all 
people want to be imitated, but the famous, the prestigious, and the knowledgeable have more power to 
convince naïve agents that it is  they, and not some others, who sho uld be imitated.60
17 I use these terms to avoid the cumbersome jargon of 'j -type agents' and 'k -type agents'.
18 Assortive mating would be redundant, since below it is assumed that children are encultured mostly 
within their group anyway.
19 In the simulation  of the model, the values of this probability will be bounded at 0 and 1.
20 We are assuming that preferences are transmitted via judgments of happiness and income. Both of these 
can be observed (albeit with error) and therefore compared across individuals.  Utility cannot be observed 
and cannot be compared across individuals; utility cannot be the basis of theories of cultural preference 
transmission. Yet in many circumstances (e.g. bargaining theory), it makes sense to think of utility and 
income as equivale nt, and in other cases (tax policy analysis), it makes sense to think of utility and well -
being as equivalent. Thus one can see why payoff -based models are a plausible and intuitive initial 
approach to modeling cultural preference transmission. Since we of ten think of happiness and income as 
the payoffs of our actions, it makes sense to use payoffs as the standard for the transmission of tastes  – even 
if, in reality, it is the happiness and the income, and not the payoffs themselves, which structure our 
decisions to adopt a taste or not. In this model, we examine cases where happiness and income are not 
necessarily the payoffs of our actions; they remain the standard of taste adoption, but not the standard of 
behavior. 
21 If we assumed that the original bund le (y 0, L 0) were still the bliss point, increases in wages would make 
even the grasshoppers less happy.
22 In fact we will assume that there is no migration between societies. If there were, it would have effects 
similar to the cross -group enculturation and  conversion processes within a society, which have already been 
described. By ruling these out, we effectively define a society as a group whose children can only be 
encultured by adult group members, and whose adults can only enculture the group's childre n.
23 Greif (1994) argues that cultures are strongly path -dependent, and that the transition from an inferior 
cultural form to a superior one may take a great deal of time or perhaps may never happen. It is interesting 
that his study of Mediterranean trader s is trying to explain why some cultures did  not adopt a cultural 
institution that increased incomes. In other words, the failure of competitive selection pressures to convert a 
group to a higher -income cultural practice is treated as an anomaly, worthy of  special modeling and 
explanation. Implicitly, the general rule must be that societies with higher incomes are copied by societies 
with lower incomes whenever social institutions are sufficiently flexible.
24 If wages in type j societies were higher than th ose in type k societies, and if  ￿j and  ￿k were close to one 
another, it could be the case that a society with more grasshoppers would have higher average incomes. 
One could make the argument that a society which focuses more on well -being might be intellec tually more 
vibrant and hence would have a higher level of development, hence higher wages. However, the within -
society model above made the counter -argument that development itself, by increasing the wage, would 
reduce the number of grasshoppers. Ultimate ly, development is a matter of investment, which depends on 
savings, which in turn depends on income. In the fable, it is the ants and not the grasshoppers who have 
savings. 
25 It would not be difficult to build a model in which people sacrificed leisure t o devote time to 
strengthening family relations. People with tastes for family -building would be happier, and so the 
selection of tastes based on well -being would favor tastes for family building. Also, people with tastes for 
family building would produce  children who were less likely to commit suicide, lending an advantage in 
terms of natural selection. Undoubtedly such mechanisms exist and they explain the long -run persistence of 
the family to this point. I have chosen to focus on achievement mechanisms i nstead, however, because 
history seems to show them to be stronger. The objects that achievement mechanisms favor have grown 
more or less steadily throughout recorded time, and individuals in contemporary post -industrial 
civilizations enjoy the highest lev els of income, power (in the form of freedoms), knowledge, and mass 
communications that have ever been experienced in human history. The objects that family mechanisms 
(and other relationship mechanisms, such as to gods and the self) favor have not grown s teadily throughout 
recorded time. Indeed, one could argue that people in contemporary post -industrial civilizations suffer 
under the weakest relationships with intimate partners, families, gods, and the self that have ever been 
experienced in human history .